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I. Introduction 
The economic climate in the 1970s was particularly unstable 
not only because of oil price changes but also because of wide-
ranging fluctuations in commodity prices and induced changes in 
patterns of world demand. One of the consequences of this 
relative economic stagnation has been an increasing difficulty for 
governments to finance their customary budgets. 
As debt service costs have risen and revenue has levelled off or 
declined, governments have been forced to re-evaluate programs 
in an effort to curtail government spending. _ 
The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the ex-
tent, direction and form of budgetary tradeoffs between defense 
and other social-economic programs in Venezuela and several of 
the other major Latin American countries. An attempt will be 
made to answer several specific questions: 
1. Is there a significant relationship between defense and social-
economic expenditures over time?; 
2. Does defense spending cut spending in other social-economic 
programs in Venezuela and other major Latin American 
country? ; 
3. Are there any common elements among countries with similar 
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defense and non-defense budget allocations?, and 
4. Do military regimes differ from civilian regimes in the manner 
in which defense and non-defense budgetary allocations are 
made? 
II. Tradeoff Literature 
To date, analyses of budgetary tradeoffs have concentrated 
almost exclusively on the developed countries, proceeded from a 
variety of theoretical perspectives, and produced conflicting, mix-
ed results. Peroff and Podolak-Warren concluded that the 
"number of studies which indicates the existence of a tradeoff 
approximates the number that shows that none exists." 
While the bulk of the research on budgetary tradeoffs between 
defense and ~ocial program expenditures· has focused on the in-
dustrial countries of North America and Western Europe, Hayes 
has suggested that the problem of tradeoffs between defense spending 
and social investments_ "is perhaps even more serious in the developing 
countries." In a major United Nations report, the Secretary 
General argued that when the needs of economic development 
are so pressing in a major United Nations report, the Secretary 
General argued that when the needs of economic development 
are so pressing in developing countries, it is "a disturbing 
thought that these countries have found it necessary to increase 
military spending so speedily, particularly when their per capita 
income is so low." The report concluded that military ex-
penditures undoubtedly absorb resources that are "substantial 
enough to make a considerable difference both in the level of in-
vestment for civil purposes and in the vo1Ull1e of resources which 
can be devoted to improving man's lot through social and other 
·services. "1 The clear implication of this UN report for the 
developing countries is that increased defense spending may have 
negative consequences for socio-economic development programs 
such as health, education, social security, economic services and 
so forth. 
In a study of the costs of defense in the U.S. between 1938 and 
~ 
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1969, B.M. Russett concuded that each dollar increase in defense 
spending resulted in a subtraction of "forty-two cents from per-
sonal consumption spending, twenty-nine cents from fixed capital 
formation, ten cents from exports, five cents from federal govern-
ment civilian programs and thirteen cents from stat~ and local 
government activities." 
Unfortunately, Russett's analysis is distorted by the data of the 
World War II years, in which percentage allocations to defense 
were two to three times larger than in other years. In a re-analysis 
of the data, Hollenhorst and Ault divided the 1939-1968 series in-
to three wars plus peacetime. The majority of the significant 
tradeoff relationships occur in the World II period. Other signifi-
cant tradeoffs vary across the four periods and in several instances 
negative relationships become positive. The authors conclude 
regarding Russett's question "Who Pays for Defense?" that: 
in an "intense" war period (World War II) probably everyone 
pays. In peacetime, however, and in the "lesser" wars of the re-
cent past (Korea, Vietnam) the consumer pays n~arly the entire 
bill, while the proportion of GNP consisting of state-local 
government expenditures and some tfl>es of fixed investment 
expenditures have, at times, increased along .with increases in 
defense spending. 
Russett, himself, in a ·more detailed analysis which omits the 
World War II period found a substantial r~duction in the number 
of significant substitution relationships. 
For a variety of reasons, the U.S. is relatively a typical in both 
the pattern and content of its defense spending. While this in no 
way reduces the importance of the concern over possible negative 
tradeoffs with other program expenditures, it does make the U.S. 
case inappropriate as a model for cross-national hypothesis testing 
(Hayes). 
Smith found from his analysis of a set of OECD time series 
that there was a negative association between military expen-
ditures and investment and that this result was robust whether the 
data were treated as time series, cross section, or po~led, and for a 
variety of assumptions about stochastic structure. Frederick Pryor 
oerformed an analvsis similar to the Russett research usinv data 
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two different years, he found no statistically significant substitu-
tion relationships (negative regression coefficients) in either year. 
Using time series data for 1950-1962, he found that "defense ex-
penditures do not have a statistically significant relationship with 
non-military budgetary expenditure8 in any country." (Pryor, 
p. 122) Breaking down the non-military comp~nent into GNP ag-
gregates (private consumption, domestic investment, . domestic 
plus foreign investment, and current civilian government expen-
ditures) he found extremely mixed relationships. Only in those 
countries with relatively high defense budget components were 
substitution relationships found, and only with current govern-
ment civilian expenditures, excluding transfers. When transfers 
were included, no substitution relationships were found for the 
same nations. 
Eighty percent of world military expenditures were accounted 
for by six nations, five of these included in the Pryor sample. The 
finding that substitution relationships occur oJ.11y in those coun-
tries "with high defense budgets is therefore striking. With one ex-
ception, none of the countries studied by Pryor would be classified 
as developing, but the UN notes2 that the military budgets of 
developing countries are increasing at almost twice the rate of the 
developed countries. Is this pattern of tradeoffs in the Third 
World similar to that of developed countries? Benoit's major study 
of the impact of defense on economic growth in a sample of forty-
four developing countries concluded; much to the author's sur-
prise, that" the evidence simply did not allow one to concluded 
that any ... adverse net effect on economic growth had occurred as a 
result of defense activities?" While Benoit's aggregate measure of 
economic growth obscures some of the more critical issues of 
distribution of economic resources, the conclusion he draws sug-
gests that we must question the assumptions with which we ap-
proach the problems of tradeoffs imposed by military allocations 
(Hayes). 
Most scholars studying the developing states have approached 
the guns-versus-butter question from a slightly different point of 
view - the comparison of policy outputs of military and civilian 
regimes and the consequence of militarism for modernization. 
Along these lines, political scientists have employed various 
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methodologies and examined a wide range of variables for the 
purpose of evaluating the performance of military and civilian 
governments in Latin America (Nordlinger, Schmitter, Weaver). Of 
the many\ hypothesis advanced and tested, one of the more in-
terestng has been the respective roles of military and civilian regimes 
in the arms race vs. their promotion of socio-economic well-being. 
Although approaches for examining a defense/social welfare 
tradeoff or a pro-defense vs. pro-economic development stance 
among regime types have varied, pollitical scientists during the 
last several decades have generally treated regime type as the in-
dependent variable and various macropublic policy indicators as 
dependent variables. Similar methodologies have been employed 
by historians. Sociologists, in what is becoming a rapidly growing 
body of literature, have addressed various issues pertaining to the 
sociology of the military in developing countries, although most of 
their attention has been confuied to regions outside of Latin 
America (Pluta). 
Eric Nordlinger summarizes the "prevailng interpretation": 
The likely consequences of military rule are economic growth, the 
modernization of economic and social structures and a more 
equitable distribution of scarce economic values and opportuniti~. 
As sponsors of these types of change, soldiers in mufti are depicted 
as progressive forces whose politicization is to be commended if not 
recommended, rather than being condemned as usurpation of 
civilian authority. 
Nordlinger, himself, disagrees with this interpretation, arguing 
that "except under conditions (for example, particularly low levels 
of economic development and political mobilization) soldiers in 
mufti are not agents of modernization" but rather act in pur-
suance of their military corporate interests and protect" a par-
ticular type of political stability" and middle class interests and 
identities. 
Schmitter finds conflicting hypotheses in the literature on the 
impact of military intervention: (1) the military is dedicated 
to the preservation of order and maintenance of the social 
status quo: (2) the military is dedicated to national develop-
ment goals including "important increments in the role of public 
authority in areas such as investment health and education, in-
,.......,.T'T1i'° T"orl;c.-t-.....;h .. 11f-;,,...., .-..nrl ;nrl1111~t-_;..,,1 rn.~ .... ...,.,._......,,_._ .. '' /Cl.' t-h- ._...:1: ........... ., 
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political system" ... and the substance of policy making is relative· 
ly indifferent to military or civilian hegemony." (pp. 430-32) Using 
both cross sectional and logitudinal data on a variety of political 
and economic indicator for twenty Latin American countries, 
Schmitter concluded that (pp. 492-93): 
Indicators of overall system performance (outcomes) are much 
less predictably affected by regime-type or changes in regime-
type than are indicators of direct governmental allocations (out· 
puts) ... but "no regime type seems to exclusively responsible for 
developmental success' in Latin America ... The military in 
power definitely tend to spend more on themselves - above all 
when they are on-again, offagain regimeJi ... Civilian regimes 
definitely spend less on defense (when they are not plagued by 
frequent interruptions and threats) and more on welfare. 
Both types of regimes have erratic records· on public invest-
ment, a fact which Schmitter acknowledges is "probably due to 
vagaries in resource availability more than to intetnal dynamics" 
(p. 493). 
On the other hand, in a major study Pluta concluded that 
little apparent relationship existed between regime type and 
either level of defense spending or size of armed forces. Pluta 
found that civilian governments, however, did tend to import 
a higher real dollar value of arms. Four of the five social 
measures used by Pluta ·indicated that civilian governments have 
taken a more active interest in social programs than their military 
counterparts. Civilian governments spend more for education and 
health and reductions in infant mortality are more substantial 
under these regimes. They also have greater newsprint consump-
tion and, hence, the demand for reading materials and the flow 
of (written) information is greater, indicating a greater interest in 
education on the part of civilian rulers. 
Pluta notes that the finding regarding regime type and the 
level of military spending is not surprising and is supportive of 
similar conclusions advanced in earlier studies. The ambiguous 
relationship between regime type and size of armed forces may 
simply be a reflection of the reime type/defense budget ambigui-
ty. However, the relatively high level of civilian government arms 
purchases may suggest a number of factors including perhaps, less 
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the military, in effect, to reduce the likelihood of armed revolt 
and/or opposition to civilian-initiated reform programs (Pluta). 
In another study of civilian and military regimes in Latin 
America, Dickson found that: (1) military regimes appear to have 
been more fiscally conservative than civilian ones and (2) civilian 
regimes appear to have been more developmentally-oriented than 
military ones. In justification, military regimes were inclined to 
spend less and run lower deficits, even though they spend more on 
the military. They showed a lower rate of increase in the cost of 
living and maintained a stronger international liquidity position 
for the Central Bank. Civilian regimes, for their part, spent more, 
did more for education and effected higher savings and invest-
ment rates, although the military had an edge in electrical pro-
duction. 
In contrast, in her analysis of budgetary allocations to defense 
and a variety of socioeconomic programs in Brazil between 1950 
and 1967, Hayes concluded that military spending did not 
necessarily yield negative consequences for social and eco-
nomic investments. She found that "substitutions between 
military allocations and allocations to other sectors do occur fre-
quently, but that the burden of these substitutions is distributed 
across all categories at one time or another." Further she judged 
that "substitutions are not severe." Overall defense spending "ac-
companied substantial increases in spending for infrastructure 
development and aspects of this associated with greater Central 
Government activity." She did find, on the other hand, that in-
creased defense spending has some negative effects on social spen· 
ding but that this "was mild because social investment was not a 
major priority of any of the regimes examined." Nevertheless, 
Hayes reported a correlation of -0.23 between defense an_d soc;;ial 
development (education, healthy, welfare) expenditures, measured 
as percentages of the total public budget. In addition, a -0.23 cor-
relation was registered between spending on military personnel 
and social development expenditures. Although "theoretical 
generalizations cannot be made and hypotheses cannot be ac-
cepted or rejected on the basis of evidence from a single case," 
Raye's research seems to indicate a mildly negative trade-off be-
tween defense and education expenditures. 
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that "education and defense spending both rise and fall at 
the same time." Correlating defense and education spending 
in absolute terms, as percentage changes from year to year 
and, relative to total budget and gross domestic product for in-
dividual country years and for regimes, Ames and Goff reported 
rather high positive correlations in the rate of + 0.29 to + 0.96. 
They reported two slightly negative correlations between defense 
and education expenditures measured relative to total budget, 
-0.08 and ~0.03 for the pooled analysis and for the individual 
regimes respectively. Mindful of serious auto-correlation problems 
in their analysis, Ames and Goff concluded that, although other 
unspecifiable policy areas may lose out in the budgetary process, 
clearly neither education or defense "gain at the expense of the 
other"(pp. 179-180). 
The evidence of the negative impact of military allocations in 
either developed and developing states is far less conclusive than 
Bruce Russett's emphatic, "I assume that defense spending has to 
come at the expense of something else" (p. 133). To the extent 
that this generalization is sometimes correct, the evidence is 
inconclusive as to whether the burden varies from country to 
country or that political (regime differences) or economic (levels 
and rates of development) factors have some influence on the fre-
quency, the locus (who pays) and the weight (degree of substitu-
tion) of the tradeoff burden. 
In the following analysis, an attempt is made to build upon 
previous research reported to date and to specify more precisely 
the extent, direction, and form of defense-economic social spen-
ding tradeoffs in the Latin American countries in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. 
Clearly, in the context of this paper the objective of this 
analysis is not to enter the controversy about whether the military 
is a modernizing agency of change, a nation-builder or active in 
the construction of economic and social overhead capital or, alter-
natively, whether the military is an impediment to development 
- a consumer of large amounts of public money in non-productive 
goods and services. The results of previous analysis (Looney 
and Frederiksen) of military goods producers in Latin America 
indicated that there were p<>sitive impacts of increased military 
PvnPn...1it11TPC! nn trrnu.Tf-),, "" ..... h.~1- .. i.. ..... --- ---..l------ _____ __! ____ _..1 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES 77 
were given including the pos1t1ve spin-off benefits associated 
with indigenous military production and the role of budgetary 
stabilization in producing countries. The work below attempts to 
extend this analysis - i.e., have the producing countries 
systematically different budgetary tradeoffs than the non-
producing countries and, if so, what are the implications for 
predicting likely defense expenditures in the future. 
More specifically, when public policy demands exceed the 
available public resources, budgetary tradeoffs are bound to occur 
between and among different policy areas; one policy area may 
gain at the expense of other policy areas in the allocation of scarce 
resources. Budgetary tradeoff patterns range on a continuum be-
tween two extremes. It may be that increases in defense spending 
come at the expense of, say, health spending or education spen-
ding; that is, as defense spending increases, spending on educa-
tion or health may actually decrease producing a negative 
tradeoff. This result is sometimes referred to as a substitution ef-
fect. Positive tradeoff occurs if defense spending increases are 
matched by real increases in health or education spending. For 
any particular Latin American country, the actual tradeoff will 
certainly fall somewhere between these two extremes. Of course, it 
is always possible that defense spending bears no relationship, 
negative or positive, to education spending, producing a pattern 
in the middle of the tradeoff continuum - no tradeoff. 
III. The Methodology 
Two basic methodological concerns relating to tradeoff 
analysis have been discussed at some length in previous studies. 
The first relates to the type of data format or design that is most 
appropriate to a proper assessment of tradeoff hypothesis. Which 
design should be used- a cross sectional or time series design? The 
second concern refers to the definition and measurement of the 
expenditure variables. The present analysis rests upon. a ~ime 
series design wherein expenditure terms are based on ratios, i.e., 
defense and other budgetary expenditures as a percentage of total 
public expenditures. 
rr . ...1.! ________ __! __ ....] -L---- __ ... !1!--...l .... 
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of the statistical problems encountered in this type of design. 
Others have used cross sectional designs; these analyses have pro-
duced mixed findings, often showing no negative or substitution 
effects. Peroff and Podolak-Warren have argued that cross sec-
tional analysis is an inadequate approach ·to this problem in this 
type of analysis since it only indicates "whether different countries 
exhibit different priorities at a single point in time. In order to 
determine the nature of budgetary tradeoffs in a particular coun-
try, budgetary patterns over time must be examined. In the pre-
sent case, analysis is based on thirteen annual time series data set 
for the 1972-83 time period. The length of the time series varies 
slightly from country to country. The data are all taken from the 
Intematinal Monetary Fund, Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook and the Stockholm International Peace Research In-
stitute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook. 
The advantage of these sources are that similar conventions for 
categorizing data by expenditure type are cqnstant across all of 
the countries. 
Similar to several other tradeoff studies, reliance is made on 
regression analysis to examine each separate time series.11 
In a regression analysis with non-military sending by type as 
the dependent variable, defense spending as the independent 
variable and various measures of government expenditures or in-
come· as the control variable, the unstandardized regression coeffi-
cient for the defense spending term indicates the direction and 
magnitude of the tradeoff between defense and other types of 
government expenditures. 
The general hypothesis proposed here is that tradeoffs be-
tween military and other types of expenditures over time may be a 
more valid indicator of government priorities than examining the 
levels of military expenditure between, for example, military and 
non-military regimes. The identification of a regime as military or 
civilian is often tenuous ; for instance, how much influence does 
the inilitary still exert over the nominally civilian government of 
Argentina today? (Cox). In addition, studies which claimed 
military regim~s reduced social expenditures may have been based 
S Regressions were performed using defense expenditures from both the IMF and 
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on spurious correlations; since, historically, military coups in 
Latin America have often been spurred by economic crises, social 
service reductions may have been as much a response to the dic-
tates of austerity as an idieological choice. 
A review of the tradeoff literature indicates that there has 
been some controversy over how the expenditure variables should 
be measured in order to test properly for budgetary tradeoffs. 
Peroff and Podolak-Warren point out that the "choice of measure 
clearly affects the results of the analysis - depending on whether 
the budget is expanding, stable or contracting." They argue that 
a negative tradeoff may not be detected between absolute or per 
capita measures of defense and non-defense policy expenditures, 
if the budgetary process is, in fact, an expanding sum game 
represented by a growing public sector. Therefore, the current 
study measures defense and non-defense expenditures in terms of 
percentages of the total public budget in order . to asses policy 
commitments and relative policy priorities in each of the countries 
included in the analysis. 
As noted above, non-defense measures are treated as the 
dependent variable in the regression analysis that follows; defense 
spending is entered as the independent variable. It is expected 
that as defense spending increases, non-defense expenditures will 
decrease; that is, a substitution effect or negative tradeoff is 
hypothesized. 
In order to improve the specifications of the regression models 
and to obtain less biased estimates of the budgetary tradeoffs, 
government expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic pro-
duct was included as a variable. 
The public fmance literature indicates the importance of real 
per capita income as a variable in the rise of public spending and 
as a significant factor in budgetary tradeoffs. Moreover, real per 
capita income is a measure of the level of economic development 
and the resources available to the public sector. As a result, this 
variable was also tested in the regression equations. 
Clearly, however, real per capita income may. not be the 
appropriate control variable for all expenditure items and for all 
countries. Several other logical control variables were (1) govem-
mPnt PYnPnrlitnTf' as a .share of Q"I'OSS domestic nroduct. (2) total 
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per capita, and (4) real gross domestic product. 
The regression equation with the highest overall r-square was 
selected for each defense-government expenditure potential 
tradeoff. 
The following linear tradeoff equation4 was estimated for each 
of the thirteen country time series. The signs of the coefficients 
represent the expected direction of the relationships: 
where Y; =non-defense spending/total Central Government spen-
ding; i = (1) public services, (2) health, (3) education, ( 4) social 
security-welfare, (5) housing, (6) other community services, (7) 
economic services and (8) other purposes; X1 =defense spending/ 
total Central Government spending; X,. = control variable where 
i= (1) total Central Government expenditures/gross domestic pro-
duct, (2) real Central Government expenditures (total Central 
Government expenditures deflated by the constant price index for 
1980= 100.00, (3) real gross domestic product (1980= 100.00), (4) 
real Central Government total expenditures per-capita, (5) real 
gross domestic product per capita. 
IV. Empirical Results 
In general, the results for the 13 countries were quite good in 
terms of the correlation coefficients obtained and a number of 
statistically significant relationships were found between defense 
~xpenditures and other government expenditures. On a country 
by country basis, the statistically significant relationships found 
were: 
Venezuela (Table 1) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services, 
4 A similar formulation was used by J. Viner in his analysis of budgetary tradeoffs for 
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(2) social security-welfare, 
(3) housing, and 
(4) other purposes. 
81 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) economic services. 
Brazil (Table 2) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) housing, and 
(2) other community services. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Argentina (Table 3) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services, and 
(2) education 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) other purposes. 
Chile (Table 4) . 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services; 
(2) education, 
(3) social security, and 
(4) other purposes. . 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(I) health, 
(2) housing, and 
(3) economic services. 
Ecuador (Table 5) 
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. . 
(1) social security, 
(2) economic services, and 
(3) health. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Dominican Republic (Table 6) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services, and · 
(2) other purposes. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Mexico (Table 7) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) education. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) economic services. 
Peru (Table 8) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Bolivia (Table 9) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1 )J economic services, and 
(2) other purposes. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
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(3) health, and 
(4) other community services. 
Paraguay (Table 10) 
Negative,tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) economic services. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services, 
(2) health, and, 
(3) social security. 
Costa Rica (Table 11) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) health. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) other government services. 
Uruguay (Table 12) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
none. 
Positive tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) health, 
(2) social security, 
(3) other community services. 
El Salvador (Tabl 13) 
Negative tradeoffs between defense and other government 
expenditures: 
(1) public services, 
(2) education, 
(3) health, 
(4) social security, 
(5) housing, and 
.'I ------- --~"---- ---~---
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expenditures: I: (1) other purposes. 
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-s a oe J: social services trended to have a negative tradeoff ·with ~ 0 8 J! ~ rJ) J i! economic services. ~ ..,.;;- ... !I "'- :l "' -~ 0 ....:N u i: 5. With the exception of El Salvador and Argentina, all = I,!.- .. 
" E Cl g, 0 
countries that had a· statistically significant relationship ~ :3 ~ s 0 M' 
" 
-~ .. ~ 
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II 13 .... 8 ........ -~f DO 'D a ... ~ :>s::o "'M 
In general, if we rule out El Salvador as a somewhat special ...; rri .$! II II II II·£!~ .c J! I.!., ~ cu'=' 
case due to the long-running civil war there, what do the two " 13 e ., ~ ·- ~ ~ u;:... 
other groups of countries - (1) Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, " 8 e :!. ~ :e c e Ji ...... ~ Q ~ .s .g $ ~ ~ 13 .'Ej 
Chile, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru - and - 0 -~ t!:: !:! .. _ .. - ... .. "" 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1972- 1982 
Budget Categories Control Variables 
Social Other Government Government 
Public Security Community Economic Other Expenditure ~ovemment Expenditure Statistics 
Equation SeiTices Education Health Welfare Boualns Services Services Purposes Per GDP ~xpenditure Per Capita RHO ~ DW 
(I) ~0,03 0.09 0.08 
(-0.78) (0.06) (0.25) 0.205 o. 77. 1.55 
(2) -0.04 -0.04 -0.14 
(-0.08) (-1.90) (-0.04) 0.930 40.16 1.94 
(3) -0.05 -0.08 -0.43 
(-0.37) (0.24) (-1.53) 0.377 1.81 2.i4 
(4) -0,03 -0.03 -0.27 
(-0.26) (-0.50) (-0.87) 0.338 l.Sl 2. 25 
(5) -0.07 -0.10 0.09 
(-2.00) (-2.02) (0.30) 0.395 1.96 2.30 
(6) -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 
(-2.32) c-1.42> (-0.14) 0.721 7.78 1.93 
(7) -O.o2 -1.09 0.78 
(-1.64) (-1.45) (4.00) 0.337 1.53 1.40 
(8) -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 
(-1.32) (-0.14) (-0.24) 0.639 5.31 1.72 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( . ) = t statistic 
F = F stati.i!•ic: 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
y Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; S/PRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In-
mal Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
f)k, 1984. 
Table 3 
.ARGENTINA: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1972-1982 
Budset Catesorles Control Variables 
Social Other Gov't 
Public Security Commumty Economic Other Expenditures GDP Statistics 
Equation Servicea Education Health Welfare Housina Services Servicea Purposea Per GDP RHO r' F 
(!) -O.Q3 
-0.04 0.51 
(-2.27) (-3.19) (1.77) 0.720 7.73 
(2) O.ll8 -0.03 0.08 
(-4.35) (-1.47) (0.24) 0.766 9.86 
(3) 0.01 0.03 0.22 
(-1.94) (-1.44) (0. 75) 0.429 2.2S 
(4) 
-0.01 -0.03 0.85 
(-1.46) (-1.44) (4.91) 0.265 1.08 
(S) 
-0.08 -0.08 0.495 
(-1.05) (-2.00) (1.80) 0.375 1.80 
(6) 0.018 -.0.04 0.37 
(1.39) (0.31) (1.22) 0.264 1.07 
(7) ·O.o3 -0.07 0.38 
(-0.35) (-0.75) (1.25) 0.087 0.28 
(8) 0.14 -0.03 -0.58 
(4.08) (-0.60) (-2.26) 0.809 12.71 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin· Watson statistic 










Lry Data from Stockholm Intemationa!Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In-



























CHILE: DEFENSE ExPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1982 
Budget Cate1oriea Control Variables 
Social Other 
Public Security Community Economic Other Government Per Capita 











































RHO ~ DW 
-0.25 
(-0.80) 0.867 19.55 2.06 
-0.21 
(-0.66) 0.899 26.72 1.14 
-0.09 
(-0.30) 0.517 3.21 3.14 
0.02 
(0.06) 0.902 27.72 1.20 
0.36 
(1.19) 0.678 6.32 3.01 
0.23 
(0.71) 0.201 0.78 1.60 
0.09 
(0.28) 0.932 41.11 1.37 
0.24 
(0.76) 0.850 17.12 2.38 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
:rom International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Finan-
~atistics Yearbook, 1984. 
ation 
Table 5 
EcUADOR: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1982 
Budget Categories Control Variables 
Social Government Government 
Public Security Economic Other Expenditure Expenditure Statistics 
Services Education Welfare Services Pnrposes Health Per Capita GDP GDP RHO r2 
-0.12 
-0.02 0.05 
(-0.SO) (-1.62) (0.14) 0.404 
-0.004 0.06 
(-0.09) (0.19) 0.245 
-0.06 -0.07 0.55 
(-3.26) (-1.94) ( 1.98) 0.640 
-0.24 -o.oi -0.3S 
(-3.79) (-19.20) (-1.14) 0.986 
-1.05 -0.09 0.32 
(-1.88) (-0. 70) ( 1.03) 0.398 
-0:11 -0,03 0.26 
(-2.81) (-3.00) (0.82) 0.634 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
{ ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 















from International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Finan-



























DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1982 
Budaet Catqorlu Control V uiablea 
Social Other Government Grosa: 
Public Security Community Economic Other Expenditure Per Capita Domestic Statlatlca 
Equation Serrices Education Health Welfare Holllllug Serrices Services Purposea Per Capita GDP Product RHO 7""F"" 
(I) -0.51 -0,03 
-0.60 
(-2.79) (-0.38) (-2.24) .0.588 4.28 
(2) 0.33 -0.04 0.55 
(0.64) (-I.ii) (2.01) 0.387 1.90 
(3) 
-0.09 -0,02 0.09 
(-0.19) (-0.78) (0.28) 0.101 0.33 
(4) 0.12 -0,0J -0.70 
(0.42) (3.02) 0.171 0.62 
(S) O.Sl -0.Q? 0.31 
(0.62) (l.67) (1.00) 0.384 1.87 
(6) 
-0.02S 0.06 -0.3S 
(-1.77) (1.13) (- 1.12) 0.506 3.07 
• (7) 
-1.49 -0.01 0.06 
(-1.16) (-2.26) (-0.19) 0.527 3.34 
(8) 
-0.98 0.02 0.13 
(-2.32) . (2.37) (0.40) 0.655 5.19 
·-Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 










L = Variable lagged one year 
ry Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,· World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In· 
ional Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
ooh, 1984. 
Table 7 
MEXICO: DEFENSE ExPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1982 
Budget Categories Control Variables 
Social Government 
Public Security Economic Other GDP Government Expenditure Statistics 






























(0.80) 0.263 1.07 1.98 
-0.41 
(- 1.37) 0.834 15.16 1.59 
0.47 
(1.61) 0.754 9.22 2.05 
-0.09 -0.64 
(-4.11) (-2.68) 0.977 130.74 2.07 
0.09 
(0.29) 0.466 2.62 1.53 
-0.12 
(-0.37) 0.491 2.89 2.26 
;: Estimations are made wing Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial 
( ) = t statistic 
correlation correction: 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
ary Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In· 


























PERU: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1981 
Budget Cateaories Control Variables 
Government 
Public Social Other Expenditure GDP 









(-0.61) (-1.lS) (-0.SS) 
-0.03 -0.02 0.19 
(-0.IS) (-2.87) (O.S6) 
0.02 0.08 -0.23 





(-I.SS) (-3.61) (0.18) 
0.09 -0.04 -O.S4 
(0.73) • (12.37) (-1.84) 
-0,02 
-0.06 0.04 
(-I.OS) (-6.76) (0.10) 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = 'Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
Statistics j.Z F DW 
0.267 0.72 1.97 
0.640 3.6S 1.23 
o.os 0.11 1.99 
O.SIS 8.82 0.86 
0.97S SO.OS 1.58 
0.908 19.80 2.6S 
ry Data from Stockholm IntemationalPeace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In-
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Table 9 
BOLIVA: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1982 
Budaet Catqoriea Control Variables 
Social Other Go•ernment 
Public Security Community Economic Other Expenditures Government Statiltlcs 
Equation Services Education Health Welfare Housina Serricea Services Purpoaes Per Capita Expensea llHO ~ DW 
(I) 0.44 0.05 0.72 
(6.33) (0.67) (3.13) 0.874 20.94 2.44 
(2) 0.62 0.03 0.25 
(3.00) (2.57) (0. 78) 0. 752 9.10 1.60 
(3) 0.62 0.01 -0.53 
(3.38) (2.13) (-1.88) 0.209 7.33 2.44 
(4) 0.6S 0.01 0.19 
(0.48) (2.70) (0.60) 0.484 2.82 2.16 
(S) 0.08 0.03 O.Ql 
(1.56) (I.IS) (0.06) 0.418 2.07 2.18 
(6) 0.06 0.04 0.29 
(2.23) (1.62) (0.91) 0.476 2.72 1.80 
(7) 
-1.01 0.02 O.SI 
(-2.23) (-3.90) (1.82) 0.771 10.14 2.38 
(8) 
-3.30 -0.01 -0.33 
(12.81) (-15.66) (-1.06) 0.985 201.25 2.62 
Estimations are made. using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic ' 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
'rom International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, Intemationfal Finan-· 







PARAGUAY: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1972-1982 
Budaet Cateaories Control Variables 
Social Other Government 
Public Security Community Economic Other GDP Expenditures Government Statistlcs 
Equation Servicea Education Health Welfare Housin1 Servicea Services Puriioaea Per Capita Per GDP Exp~•RHO i' P DW 
(I) 1.83 0.08 -0.35 
(2.75) (2.68) (C 1.20) 0.536 3.4 7 2.25 
(2) 0.35 -o.oa 0.12 
(J.45) (-0.76) (0.38) 0.353 1.63 . 1.65 
(3) 1p1 O.o3 -0.04 
(2.44) (4.49) (-0.12) 0.766 9.86 2.51 
(4) 2.71 0.03 -0.80 
(2.51) (3.27) (-4.35) 0.615 4.79 2.52 
(5) 0.18 0.o3 -0.06 
(1.00) (3.97) (-0.20) 0.79611.75 1.91 
(6) 0.05 0.40 • -0.40 (1.92) (3.90) (- 1.40) 0. 749 8.97 2.20 
(7) 
-4.74 -0,02 -0.71 
(-4.98) (-3.76) (-3.24) 0. 725 I J.07 2.33 
(8) ~J.36 -0.03 -0.4 
(-1.66) (-4.20) (-0.37) 0.798I1.87 2.03 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage .iteration pr01:edure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
·Data from Stockholm Internatinal Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In-




COSTA RICA: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1972-1982 
Budget Categories Control Variables 
Social Other Government 
Public Security Com~unity Economic Other Expenditures GDP Statistica 
Equation Services Education Health Welfare Housing Se"ices Services Purposes Per Capita Per Capita RHO •' F DW 
(I) 
-11.59 -0.01 -0.38 
(-0.89) (-1.56) (-0.66) 0.12 0.56 0.86 
(2) 1.24. 0.01 0.92 
(1.41) co-lo> ~c9:sn 0.87:i 27.43 1.02 
(3) .-12.13 0.02 0.94 
(-3.18) (0.49) (12.83) 0.561 5.11 0.84 
(4) 7.60 -0,02 0.80 
(2.48) (-I.SO) (4.23) 0.667 8.Q3 1.23 
(S) -1.37 
. o.os -0.39 (-I.BS) (-1.87) (-1.23) 0.464 3.47 2.00 
(6) o.ss 0.02 -0.72 
(4.14) (3.68) (-2.46) 0.941 63.94 1.21 
(7) 1.56 -o.oz -0.04 
(0.69) (-1.83) (-0.11) 0.3'57 2.22 1.72 
(8) -20.so -0.Ql -0.39 
(-0.96) (-1.65) (-0~68) 0.147 0.69 0.86 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
om International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues; International Monetary Fund, International Finan-


























URUGUAY: DEFENSE ExPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1983 
lud1et Categories Control Variablea 
Social Other Gonrnmeat 
Public 
Equation Senicea Education 
Seeurity Community Economic Ober l!xpendituie GDP Stalilties 
Health Welfare Houaina Seinca SerTice1 PurpOHI Per Capita GDP Per Capita RHO -;r-F DW 
(I) 0.10 -o.o3 0.68 
(0.33) (-2.78) (2.91) O.S46 3.61. 2.74 
(2) o.os o.os 0.8S 
(0.23) (0.07) (S.27) 0.01 O.o3 2.65 
(3) 0.62 -o;os -0.6S 
(3.26) (-1.21) (-2.75) 0.617 4.83 l.8S 
(4) I.SS -0.01 -0.43 
(2.48) (-2.34) (·I.SI) O.S41 3.S3 1.88 
(S) 0.01 0.06 0.45 
(0.24) (0.20) (1.61) 0.02 0.06 2.17 
' (6) 0.16 O.o2 -0.14 
(2.61) (4.0S) (-0.47) 0.840 IS.80 2.10 
(7) 0.60 o.ss 
(1.37) . (2.07) 0.216 0.8272.14 
(8) -1.27 -0.0S •M8 
(-1.91) (-0.96) (·0.94) O.S08 3.10 2.13 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction: 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
"f Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In-


















EL SALVADOR: DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-BUDGETARY TRADEOFFS 1973-1983 
Budaet Cateaoriea Control Variablea 
Social Other Gov't GDP 
Public Security Community Economic Other. Expenditures Per Gov'! Statiltica 
l!quation Services Education Health Welfare Houlina Se"ices Servlcea Purpo ... Per GDP Per Capita Expenditure& RHO 
--;r--p DW 
(!) -0.46 -0.03 -0.31 
(-6.02) (-3.23) (- 1.06) 0.841 I S.86 1.96 
(2) -0.90 -o.os -0.20 
(-7.46) (-4.18) (-0.42) 0.890 24.39 1.94 
(3) -0.14 -0.07 -0.17 
(-2.00) (-0.31) (-0.54) 0.4S6 2.51 2.38 
(4) O.IS 0.02 0.36 
(1.61) (1.62) (1.22) 0.283 1.18 1.93 
(S) -0.13 0.02 0.41 
(-4 .• 69) (1.8) (1.43) 0.593 4.38 1.42 
(6) -0.40 0.02 0.78 
(-4.69) (-3.88) (3.96) 0. 765 9.80 2.72 
(7) -0.28 0.05 0.04 
(-4.69) (0.91) (0.12) 0.223 0.86 2.31 
(8) 0.59 -0.08 -0.54 
(6.51) (-0.81) (-2.03) 0.919 34.47 2.41 
Estimations are made using Cochrane-Orcutt two stage iteration procedure for serial correlation correction. 
( ) = t statistic 
F = F statistic 
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic 
L = Variable lagged one year 
"f Data from Stockholm lntemationa!Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament; SIPRI Yearbook, 1984; other data from In· 
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grouped together on the basis of their tradeoff patterns? Or are 
these tradeoffs due to variables unique to each country's 
budgetary process? 
We can observe at this point that each group included coun-
tries that vary considerably in terms of political development, 
economic syi;tem, territory and population size, demography, 
location, levels of socio-economic development, resource 
availability, literacy, relative military size, defense expenditures, 
level of military involvement in the political system. Both groups 
of countries contain democracies and military regimes that were 
in office throughout the entire period under review. Clearly, the 
popular intepretation that military' reginles spend less on social 
services and civilian regimes spend relatively more cannot explain 
the pattern of negative and positive tradeoffs reported above. 
Schmitter has· suggested that civilians,, while increasing spen-
ding on social programs such as education, may feel constrained 
to bribe soldiers to keep them out of power; further, the military 
budget enlarged by U.S. military assistance and often committed 
to heavy capital expen<ijtures may be relatively immune to short-
term political changes (pp. 492-93). 
It is possible, too, that defense and social programs may rise 
together because both are supported by relatively powerful consti-
tuencies. It may be that deals or compromises are struck between 
these two firmly entrenched constituencies. Consequently, both 
defense and social program budgets could benefits at the expense 
of policy areas that lack similarly powerful spokesman and 
organizational pressure. 5 
One thing the results indicate is that there is considerable 
variation in the types of tradeoffs that occur in Latin America. 
The evidence seems to support the conclusion of Ames and Goff 
that "Latin America may not have a common allocation process; 
instead, different models may explain different groups of coun-
tries or time periods. 
A closer examination of the countries (Table 14) indicates at 
least one common element - whether or not a country is an arms 
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generally experience negative tradeoffs between defense expen-
ditures and social welfare expenditures tend to be the arms pro-
ducers, while those countries that experience positive relationships 
between defense and social expenditures tend to be the non-arms 
prodcuers. 
The military sector in countries possessing a domestic arms in-
dustry is able to draw on a number of interrelationships with the 
civil economy; the government might, for example, place weapons 
production contracts with private manufacturing firms and 
soldiers might be expected to spend their wages in civilian markets. 
The military sector in the producing countries is the one major 
area that is under the direct control of the Central Government. 
Economic expansion can therefore be affected immediately by, for 
example, the ordering of a new weapons system. In· coptrast, in-
direct policies such as marginal tax changes would take a much 
longer period to produce noticeable multiplier effects. Such con-
trol is also useful in the possible event of excessive expansion of the 
economy, as weapons systems can be immediately cancelled or con-
tracted to help deflate the system. 
Whynes notes: 
Once this regulation system has become established, several 
groups of people will find it economically advantageous to 
maintain it in existence. These groups will include senior 
soldiers. the owners and managers of private industries with 
which the government places defense contracts, and also politi-
cians whose careers are tied to the defense sector. 
Clearly, if military expenditures are used in an environment 
where domestic production is possible, they have the potential to 
perform an important stabilizing role, i.e., they could expand 
relative to other expenditures when the economy is in a recession 
and be reduced relative to other (less discretionary expenditures) 
during times of overheating or lack of foreign exchange. This use 
of military expenditure as a stabilizing element would produce the 
negative tradeoffs observed for the arms producers in either a zero 
sum environment or an expanding sum environment (where all 
expenditures grow over time, but military expenditures fluctuate 
mnr,o. ,,;C!_<'!l_,,;C! nt-hor hmo.C!' -.f ,.._,.,._.....__,,, __ ... ..... 11-,,,.. ..... •.:--,.\ 
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and economic services would tend to reinforce this conclusion. for 
examples, it has often been claimed that ~any gove~ents 
of less developed countries tend to regard capital ~xpenditure ~s "-
investment and recurrent expenditure as consumption. Economic /' 
growth is seen to depend largely on investment, so that govern-
ment recurrent expenditure has to be curbed in order to generat~ 
"public savings" for investment purposes for instance'. see Lim. 
There are also political reasons for this belief. Governments are 
more likely, at least in the short run, to obtain greater political 
benefits by having more, but less efficient, projects than by having 
fewer, but more efficient, ones. The former are simply more visible 
and more politically rewarding. 
One. important implication of this view is that scarce govern-
ment revenue is more likely to be spent on new projects or on the 
expansion of existing ones than ?n recurrent ~perational and 
maintenance costs. There are certainly examples in less developed 
countries of new schools being built and opened without there be-
ing sufficient qualified teachers to man them, or even to ~an 
already existing ones. If, in fact, this view is. ~orrect, one might 
expect economic services in general to be pos1uvely correlated -
or at least not statistically significant - when regressed on defense 
expenditures. 
One comes back to the fact that a fairly close link exists bet-
ween the government budget (surplus-deficit), public consump-
tion and military expenditures in the arms producing countries. 
These countries show defense expenditures linked to budgetary 
deficits, i.e., defense expenditures rise with government deficits. 
Other expenditures may be cut back d~ring periods .of high 
deficits. With surpluses, defense expenditures, everything else 
equal tend to decline in percentage terms. 
These patterns are not found in the non-producing countries. 
Apparently because these countries depend mo~e on tax revenues, 
all expenditures are increased as revenues ~se and ~ecreased 
when revenues decline. The non-arms producing countnes would 
not be able to attach any special stabilizing role tO'military expen-
ditures that could not be performed as well by other types of ex-
penditure. The positive tradeoffs between defense and sociaI ex-
penditures for the non-arms producers are, therefore, somewhat 
102 JOURNAL OF ECQNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
economic services and .other ptUposes instead sacrificed to provide 
for increases in defense expenditures? 
As Hicks and Kubisch found in a major study of austerity 
programs, when faced with difficult choices in reducing public ex-
penditures, governments consider a wide range of factors, in-
cluding political and economic costs, present versus future con-
sumption and the potential impaC:t on employment, distribution 
and welfare. Their empirical results suggest that, when govern-
ments in developing countries implement austerity programs, they· 
do not apply across-the-board reductions in · expenditures. 
. Generally, capital expenditures are reduced more than .recurrent 
expenditures. Within both capital and current budgets, the social 
and administration/defense sectors appear to be relatively well 
protected, while infrastructure and production absorb dispro-
portionately larger reductions. That the so.cial sectors do not ap-
pear to be highly vulnerable to expenditure reductions in terms of 
austerity was the novel finding of that study. 
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